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Abstract 
This study identified the potential chemical accident occurrence in Korea by analyzing the 
spatial distribution of chemical factories and accidents. The number of chemical factories and 
accidents in 25-km
2 
grids were used as the attribute value for spatial analysis. First, semi-
variograms were conducted to examine spatial distribution patterns and to identify spatial 
autocorrelation of chemical factories and accidents. Semi-variograms explained that the 
spatial distribution of chemical factories and accidents were spatially autocorrelated. Second, 
the results of the semi-variograms were used in Ordinary Kriging to estimate chemical hazard 
levels. The level values were extracted from the Ordinary Kriging result and their spatial 
similarity was examined by juxtaposing the two values with respect to their location. Six 
peaks were identified in both the factory hazard and accident hazard estimation result, and the 
peaks correlated with major cities in Korea. Third, the estimated two hazard levels were 
classified with geometrical interval and could be classified into four quadrants: Low Factory 
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and Low Accident (LFLA), High Factory and Low Accident (HFLA), Low Factory and High 
Accident(LFHA), and High Factory and High Accident (HFHA). The 4 groups identified 
different chemical safety management issues in Korea; safe LFLA group, many chemical 
reseller factories were found in HFLA group, chemical transportation accidents were in the 
LFHA group, and an abundance of factories and accidents were in the HFHA group. Each 
quadrant represented different safety management obstacles in Korea, and studying spatial 
differences can support the establishment of an efficient risk management plan.  
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1. Introduction 
Chemical materials have been used in agricultural, manufacturing, engineering, and other 
various industries, and the demand for chemical use is continually increasing [1]. In 1942, a 
mere 600 000 chemical compounds had been identified. In 1947, this number had increased 
to 4 million, and since then the total number of identified chemical compounds has risen to 
around 11 million [2]. Advancement of the chemical industry required complex systems of 
production, transportation, and storage, so the possibility of a chemical accident occurring 
and the severity of possible accidents increased [3]. As a result, many severe chemical 
accidents in recent history have affected the environment and human population. The Indian 
Bhopal accident in 1984 [4], Italian Seveso accident in 1976 [5], and Fukushima nuclear 
disaster in 2011 [6] had severe consequences for both the environment and human population. 
To combat the growing risks of chemical accidents, the United Sates established the National 
Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) [7] and the European Union introduced the 
Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) to systematically reduce 
chemical exposure [8]. 
According to the European Environment Agency [9], chemical accident management requires 
further studies in estimating the potential scale of their effects, their unpredictability, and the 
uncertainties of their consequences for Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA). ERA 
appeared to be challenging, due to a lack of related data and the complexity of the 
environment, and traditionally, results from ERA are presented in a non-spatial manner [10]. 
Chemical accidents were statistically analyzed and the most dangerous chemical materials in 
3 
 
use were identified by comparing the number of accidents, injuries, and damages [11]. 
General statistical analysis had many limitations in studying chemical accidents properly 
because chemical accidents have spatial distribution [12].  
The development of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) has greatly improved spatial 
representation and spatial analysis of all forms of information and data. Spatial statistical 
analysis can explain the distribution and pattern of spatial data based on the theory that 
“everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things” 
[13]. Spatial statistical analysis has been applied to various academic fields, including 
ecology [14], epidemiology [15], urban planning [16], and chemical risk management [17]. 
Furthermore, development of GIS technology enhanced regional level of ERA studies for 
example lead risk of soil in Blackwattle Bay region [18] and chemical accident risk 
assessment with exposure model in Nanjing chemical Industry Park [19]. Instead of 
abundance of the study, studies that apply spatial statistical analysis to chemical factories and 
accident locations from a safety management perspective for national scale were difficult to 
find. In forestry, spatial analysis was used to understand the occurrence patterns of forest fires, 
and an efficient accident management plan was suggested [20]. In chemical industry, spatial 
analysis could be very powerful tool for safety management. 
Previous studies have used different spatial analysis methods to assess chemical hazard, and 
they were categorized into 4 groups. The first group estimated risk from the measured 
chemical substance level at the sample site and used spatial analysis to estimate the level of 
chemical risk in the area [10,20,21,22,23]. The second group developed indices by 
calculating the index using existing data or geographic properties [23,24]. The third group 
used a model and scenario to predict chemical material dispersion in space [25,26,27]. The 
fourth group used remote sensing techniques and observed damage changes in space and time 
[28,29,30] This study falls into the first and the second groups, because chemical hazard 
levels were estimated by spatial analysis, and the estimated values were systematically 
classified into four classes that indicate areas with potential future accident. This study 
applied spatial statistical analysis on location of chemical factories and accidents to 
understand the spatial distribution patterns of the two variables, estimated two different 
hazard levels, and finally to classify levels into 4 groups to provide useful information for 
management purposes. 
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2.  Methodology 
2.1. Data description 
2.1.1. Definition of Hazard and Occurrence 
Hazard and risk are often confused in their use, and many articles define the meaning of the 
two words to prevent misuse [19,31]. In this article, the definitions of hazard was carefully 
selected from previous studies to avoid the misuse word with risk. From reviewing literature, 
it is appropriate to consider the number of chemical factory and accident in a grid cell as the 
hazard.  
The simple definition of hazard is “a potential damage” [32]. Following the definition of a 
hazard, chemical factories are potential damage source, where accidents can occur. Further 
definition of a hazard includes intensive property [33], which illustrates the influence of the 
chemical material, and chemical toxicity is usually a good example of this. Furthermore, 
definition of hazard includes the possibility of potential accidental pollution. Chemical 
accident records has probability since the accident had occurred. Number of the chemical 
factories and chemical accident in a grid cell also act as an intensive property and source of 
the danger, because area with high number of chemical factories and accident can expect 
higher hazard level. Occurrence means outbreak of phenomenon or incident. In this article, 
occurrence means the potential future accidents that might appear in estimated hazardous area. 
The previously occurred chemical accidents were used as the input data for the estimation. 
 
2.1.2. Study Area: South Korea 
Korea is ranked 6th in the world in chemical industry market shares and accounts for 3.4% 
(138.7 billion USD) of the world's chemical market (4.1 trillion USD), behind China (21.9%, 
903.4 billion USD), the US (17.5%, 720.0 billion USD), Japan (8.2%, 338.2 billion USD), 
Germany (5.5%, 228.8 billion USD), and Brazil (3.6%, 149.6 billion USD) [34]. The number 
of domestic chemical manufacturers registered in Korea in 2002 was 12,205, and increased to 
16,547 in 2010. According to the Hazardous Chemical Material Accident Casebook, the total 
amount of chemical material usage in Korea rose from 21,159 to 32,294 tons (52.6%), and 
the number of chemical accidents rose from 26 to 70 (169.2%) between 2001 and 2006 [35]. 
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The estimated economic loss from chemical industrial accidents is estimated to be up to 15 
trillion KRW (16.9 billion USD), and the number of victims of chemical accidents exceeded 
2,900 in 2012 [36]. 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has emphasized the necessity of 
reducing the risk of the chemical industry [37], and the 2012 Gumi hydrogen fluoride leaking 
accident in southeast chemical industry complex in South Korea increased the public 
awareness of chemical accidents’ potential to cause severe harm to people, the environment, 
and the economy.  
The Toxic Chemicals Control Act (TCCA) was enacted in 1992, and the Korea Ministry of 
Environment (MOE) has been responsible for managing toxic chemicals [38]. In 2015, the 
Chemical Material Management Act (CMMA) and Chemical Material Assessment Act 
(CMAA) were enacted after amending the TCCA. Furthermore, the CMAA included new 
clauses, such as environmental impact assessment, immediate reporting duty of accidents, 
business licensing, and the designation of a special management area to improve 
preparedness and responses to chemical accidents [39]. 
 
2.1.3. Materials: Chemical Factory and Chemical Accident Data 
Chemical factory data was provided by the MOE. There are 4,916 factories included in this 
data, and the chemical factory data includes detailed information about factories, like title, 
business registration code, owner, address, phone number, chemical materials, amount of 
them used, and chemical states. 
Chemical accident data was provided by the National Institute of Chemical Safety under 
MOE. The agency established the online Chemical Safety Cleaning House (CSC) System, 
which provides chemical accident records to the public [40]. At the beginning of the research, 
the system provided chemical accident data from 2006 to 2015, and total number of accidents 
was 418. The average annual accident outbreaks from 2003 to 2012 was 13.3 cases, but after 
2012 it increased to 97.7 cases. This phenomenon is considered to be influenced by people’s 
awareness of chemical accidents following the Gumi accident which encourage them to 
report even small accidents [41]. 
Chemical factory and accident data were geocoded based on their address and projected as 
point data on ArcGIS. The spatial distribution of the two data sets are described in Figure 1. 
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The chemical accident data for this study had 126 cases of damages to humans by accidents 
and only 14 cases resulting in economic loss. The numbers of cases were insufficient for 
spatial analysis and, regarding that even one chemical accident can cause severe damage [42], 
this study focused on occurrence of chemical accidents rather than their magnitude. 
Point data has two major characteristics: the first is the density of the point in each space, and 
the second is spatial dependence or spatial autocorrelation, which is measured from values 
and distance between the points [43,44]. Both density and spatial autocorrelation is important 
in understanding the spatial patterns of chemical accidents and factories. The density of 
points was measured by counting the numbers of factories and accidents in the 25-km
2
 grids, 
and spatial autocorrelation was measured by a semi-variogram.  
 
<Figure 1> 
 
 
2.2. Research Method 
2.2.1. Spatial Autocorrelation of Chemical Factories and Accidents 
The chemical factories and accident numbers in the 25-km
2
 grids have replaced the attribute 
value for the spatial analysis. Hazard assessment of chemical factories and accidents can be 
assessed with statistical analysis but it has many limitations [45]. For instance, prospecting 
required geostatistical analysis because statistical analysis can only estimate amount of 
mineral but where they are buried. Spatial analysis of Chemical factory and accident can 
quantify the hazard level in unknown area. 
Understanding spatial distribution pattern of chemical factories and accident is prerequisite 
before the hazard assessment. Spatial autocorrelation describes the similarity of spatial 
entities increases with close spatial location [46] and it can be quantified by Semi-variogram, 
Correlogram, Covariacne, and Madogram [45]. In this study Semi-variogram was chosen to 
determine spatial dependence of chemical factories and accident through 
geostatistics[47,48,49] before the estimation of the hazard level. The experimental Semi-
variogram was estimated by equation 1:  
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   represents spatial location of the chemical factories and accidents were translated to 
longitude and latitude.  (  ) is the attribute value of data located at   , and in this study the 
attribute values were the number of chemical factories and accidents in a grid.  (    ) is 
attribute value of data that was located away from    , with h as distance and n as the 
number of the pairs of points in lag size [41]. Semi-variogram gives the square of the 
difference between the attribute values of the two grids. When the two grids have similar 
number of chemical factory in short lag distance, the variance will be low and it estimates a 
high spatial autocorrelation of the chemical factory, and same for the chemical accidents. 
Additionally, lag size means maximum allowed distance to observe comparative point and 
lag distance refers actual distance difference of point to points within the lag size. 
After investigating spatial dependency with the experimental semi-variogram, a theoretical 
semi-variogram model should be used to describe the spatial autocorrelation as a graph [51]. 
In this study, an exponential model was selected because both chemical factories and 
chemical accident numbers in grids showed exponential growth, and Root Mean Square Error 
(RMSE) was the lowest with this model. Exponential (Equation 2) models were fitted to the 
scaled experimental semi-variograms, 
 
0h)],
a
3h
exp([1CCγ(h) 10                                             (2) 
 
Where    is the nugget effect;       is sill;   is the distance between experimental 
observations; and    is spatial dependence range [52]. Nugget effect occurs when two points 
have difference with zero separation distance and sill means variance value when model 
attains the range. The semi-variogram model levels out at a certain distance, and the distance 
at which the model first flattens out is the range. Distances further than the range are not 
spatially autocorrelated, whereas distances before the range are spatially autocorrelated [53]. 
Where the semi-variogram model attains range, the y-axis value is called the sill and it shows 
the variance of the data [54]. The partial sill is the sill subtracted from the nugget, and a high 
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partial sill means high changes in spatial distribution [54,55]. 
After, the experimental and theoretical Semi-variogram, the spatial dependency of the 
chemical factories and accident in 25-km
2
 grid is quantified to show the distribution patterns 
of the two variables, and the result of Semi-variogram allowed the study to proceed hazard 
level estimation. 
 
2.2.2. Hazard Estimation from Chemical Factories and Accidents 
Hazards from chemical factories and chemical accidents were estimated using the analysis 
result of the semi-variogram and Kriging interpolation method. Kriging is a geostatistical 
interpolation method which estimates an unknown value in an unknown location [56,57]. In 
this study, the Ordinary Kriging method was selected to prevent estimation bias and minimize 
error variance [51]. 
At the unknown location  , Ordinary Kriging estimates    
 ( ) by linear summation of a 
nearby observed value z(  ) as in equation (3) [58]: 
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In equation (3), weight 
OK
αλ  must be decided while minimizing estimation distribution 
   {   
 ( )   ( )} and satisfying a non-biased condition  {   
 ( )   ( )}   . To 
satisfy the condition, Ordinary Kriging uses equation (4) [58,59].  
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In equation (4),    ( )  and  (     )  represent the Lagrangian parameter and 
variogram value with distance between two points. The Kriging estimation value    
 ( ) 
and estimation variance in equation (5) are calculated from Ordinary Kriging.  
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Hazard values from chemical factories and accidents occurrence were estimated from 
Ordinary Kriging and all values were used to gain identification numbers respective to their 
spatial location in Korea. Estimated hazard values were arranged by identification number to 
visualize hazards change by location. Firstly, the two hazard estimation results values were 
visualized on a scatter plot and the distribution of values was observed, and secondly, 
Pearson Product Moment Correlations were conducted to measure the statistical relationships 
between hazard estimated value of chemical factories and chemical accidents. 
 
   
  



2222 y)(y][nx)(x[n
y)x)((xy)n(
r                                      (6) 
 
Where x and y is the estimated hazard of factories and accidents values from Ordinary 
Kriging and n is number of values. The correlation coefficient (r) can vary from -1 to 1. An r 
= 0 means that there is no connection between the two measures at all, and an r = 1 means 
that the two measures are positively correlated, with both moving in the same direction. An r 
= -1 also means that the two measures are negatively correlated, with both are moving in 
opposite directions. Values from -0.5 to -1 or from .5 to 1 are considered high [60]. 
 
2.2.3. Hazards Classification by Geometrical Interval 
 The objective of classification is to group data in such a manner so that the observations 
within a class similar, but also the classes themselves are dissimilar. Geometric interval is a 
mathematically defined interval system, producing class boundaries and intervening distances 
that change systematically, and this method creates class breaks based on class intervals that 
have a geometrical series [61].  
 
10 
 
L-n32 ararara ,......,,                                                      (7) 
 
Equation 7 shows how geometric interval produces class boundaries, where   is the first 
term,   is the common ratio,   is the number of terms and   is the last term,       [61]. 
As the equation is formulated, geometric interval is only a useful method when the data has 
geometrical series, an exponential function. The number of chemical factories and accidents 
in grids, and estimated hazard values of chemical factories and accidents from Ordinary 
Kriging, had geometrical series.  
In this study, estimated hazards were classified through two processes. First, the result of 
estimated hazards were classified with geometrical intervals into three groups (low, medium, 
and high). Due to a large number of zero values, the first result of geometrical interval had 
four groups (very low, low, medium, and high) but the very low and low levels were 
aggregated under low level. 
Second, hazard levels were classified together. The hazard values were arranged by their 
identification number, and computed in a graph with hazard of factories as the dependent 
variable and hazard of accidents as the independent variable. For the next step, hazard of 
chemical factories and accidents were classified into high hazard and low hazard. Each axis 
was divided into two groups, with their break values assigned from the geometrical interval, 
thereby creating a quadrant. Quadrant I is HFHA: High Factory and High Accident, quadrant 
II is LFHA: Low Factory and High Accident, quadrant III is LFLA: Low Factory and Low 
Accident, and quadrant IV is HFLA: High Factory and Low Accident. 
For the overview of the hazard assessment, firstly the spatial distribution of chemical 
factories and accident occurrence were examined by Semi-variogram, secondly the result of 
Semi-variogram and Ordinary Kriging estimated the hazard level for factories and accidents 
of South Korea, thirdly the estimation values were classified by geometrical interval. Finally, 
the results were produced as chemical factory hazard map, chemical accident hazard map, 
and together, potential chemical hazard occurrence map. 
 
2.2.4. Verification of Estimated Hazard and Risk 
The Ordinary Kriging of chemical factories and accident records estimated hazard and risk 
values in Korea. These estimated values were classified by geometrical intervals and divided 
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into three groups: low, medium, and high. The results of the Ordinary Kriging and 
geometrical interval classification were verified by overlaying the actual accident records 
over the classification results.  
Verification of estimated risk used less verification data than hazard, because accident data 
from 2003 to 2015 were used to estimate risk. Estimated hazard was verified using data from 
2003 to 2015, 2016 to 2017 and 2003 to 2017 accident records. For verification, actual 
accidents were plotted on the map and allocated into three levels of hazard and risk (high, 
medium, low), dependent on their location. After this, the number of accidents in each level 
were divided by the level’s area to calculate accident density, because high hazard/risk area is 
much smaller than low hazard/risk area (equation 8). Where D(L) is the density of the level 
area, L(n) is the number of accidents in the level area, and L(a) is the area of the level. 
Verification was conducted on entirety of Korea, and different cities of Korea, where hazard 
and risk values are significantly higher. 
 
L(a)
L(n)
D(L)                                                              (8) 
 
The same method was used to verify the classification of integrated hazard and risk results. 
The numbers of chemical accidents in 4 groups (LFLA, HFLA, LFHA, and HFHA) were 
counted and chemical accident density was calculated for comparing groups. Additionally, 
the number of factories in the 4 groups was used to verify both of hazard and risk together. 
 
 
 
3.  Results  
3.1. Spatial Autocorrelation of Chemical Factories and Accidents 
The semi-variogram of the number of chemical factories and accidents in girds is shown 
Figure 2. Spatial autocorrelation was examined in both the chemical factories and accidents 
semi-variogram results (Figure 2). The autocorrelation result was interpreted with 4 
components: range, sill, partial sill, and nugget. The chemical factory range was 12.1 km, and 
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the chemical accident range was 7.53 km therefore chemical factory had autocorrelation in 
larger area. The semi-variogram had the same values for partial sill and sill due to the no 
nugget effect which illustrate no significant error in data. The chemical factory’s partial sill 
was 57.3 and chemical accident partial sill was 0.286 which can illustrate high variance of 
chemical accident with distance. The existence of spatial autocorrelation means that the 
chemical factories and accidents are not randomly distributed in space, but have a kind of 
clustering tendency. 
 
<Figure 2> 
 
3.2. Hazard Estimation from Chemical Factories and Accidents 
Distribution of the Ordinary Kriging result were examined to validate geometrical interval as 
the proper classification method and estimated hazard values for chemical factories and 
accidents had exponential increments which makes geometrical interval a proper 
classification method (Figure 3). 
Figure 4 depicts two hazard maps from the chemical factories (a) and chemical accidents (b) 
by Ordinary Kriging. Factory hazard and accident hazard values were extracted as point data 
and arranged by their identification number. The results showed 6 peaks in both maps (Figure 
5). The peaks were matched with the administrative districts of Korea, and the cities with 
high peaks were the capital region, Daejeon city, Daegu city, Ulsan city, Busan city, and 
Yeosu city. 
The hazard value sets, arranged by identification number, were juxtaposed on the graph for 
comparison and the peaks in two different graphs were very similar. The highest hazard level 
from both factories and accidents were identified in the capital region, and Ulsan, Busan, and 
Yeosu cities. 
Additionally, Pearson correlation was used to examine similarity between two hazard 
variables. The resulting R value was 0.706, with a P value of less than 0.01. 
 
<Figure 3> 
<Figure 4> 
<Figure 5> 
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3.3. Hazard and Risk Classification by Geometrical Interval 
The result of applying the geometrical interval created break values for factory and accident 
hazard, which classified the data into four quadrants, and the break value was 0.058, 0.41 for 
the x, y-coordinate. The points located on the right side of the break values were considered 
as high hazard, and the points located above the break values were considered as high risk. 
The four classified quadrants had distinctive characteristics in their range and data amount. 
Each quadrants’ area and number of points were noted to understand differences in 
distribution patterns of the classification results. For area, quadrant I(HFHA) composed 97.2% 
of the total area in the graph and quadrants IV(HFLA), II(LFHA), and III(LFLA) composed 
2.64%, 0.17%, and 0.0046% of the area. In contrast to the result of area, quadrant III(LFLA) 
had the most points in the smallest area, containing 61.6% of the total number of points, 
while only 6.52% of total points were found in quadrant I(HFHA). Additionally, 31.5% of 
points were in quadrant IV(HFLA) and only 0.40% of points were in quadrant II(LFHA). 
According to this observation, quadrants I(HFHA) and II(LFHA) had low point data density 
while quadrants III(LFLA) and IV(HFLA) had high point data density (Figure 6).  
The four quadrants reflect different regions of factory and accident hazard level in Korea. 
Quadrant I was where both factory and accident were high(HFHA), reflecting chemical 
accidents that occurred in factories; quadrant II was where only accident was high(LFHA), 
reflecting chemical accidents during transportation; quadrant III was where both factory and 
accident were low(LFLA), reflecting no chemical factories and accidents; quadrant IV was 
where only factory was high(HFLA) reflecting factories with no accidents, but that could be 
considered as potential chemical accident location.  
The results of classification were applied on the map by matching the point identification 
number to the pixel identification number. The map created from the classification not only 
visualized the hazard and risk level differences in space, but also provided information on 
where future chemical accidents were more likely to occur, therefore, the map designates the 
potential chemical hazard occurrence in future (Figure 7). A large area of HFHA was 
observed in big cities, and the capital region had the largest area. Significantly large HFHA 
areas were identified in major cities such as Busan, Daegu, Daejeon, Ulsan, Yeosu cities. 
LFHA areas were distributed evenly throughout Korea because this class represents accidents 
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during transportation. LFLA areas were mostly found in the northeast and southwest areas of 
Korea, due to the small numbers of factories, but unlike the northeast, a cluster of HFHA was 
found in the southwest. HFLA areas were mostly found near the HFHA areas, since the 
location of chemical factories is restricted by the government (Figure 7). 
 
<Figure 6> 
<Figure 7> 
 
3.4. Verification 
The prediction accuracy of the chemical factory hazard map was verified by overlaying the 
actual chemical accident records from 2003 to 2015, 2016 to 2017 and 2003 to 2017(Table 1). 
National wide, the results of hazard map verification showed that 83.7% of accident density 
percentage in an estimated high hazard area, 15.4% in a medium hazard area, and just 0.9% 
in a low hazard area in Korea from 2003 to 2015. The 2016 to 2017 chemical accident data 
was acquired after the study had proceeded, and this data was used to verify the accuracy of 
the estimated hazard map. The accident density percentages were 87.8%, 11.0% and 1.1%, 
from high to low hazard areas from 2016 to 2017. Overall, 84.4%, 14.6%, and 0.9% of 
density percentages were observed from 2013 to 2017. Hazard verification was not only 
conducted on a national scale, but also 6 chemical industrialized cities (the capital region, 
Busan city, Daegu city, Ulsan city, Yeosu city) were selected for regional scale verification, 
and the results were similar to the national scale. Chemical accident hazard map was verified 
by the same method, but only 2016 to 2017 accident data was used because the chemical 
accident data from 2003 to 2015 was the input data for hazard estimation. The result of 
hazard map from chemical accident verification was similar to the result of hazard map 
verification of factories, and higher prediction accuracy was observed in the high hazard 
areas (Table 1). 
 
<Table 1>  
 
Also, the potential chemical hazard occurrence map was verified by applying the same 
verification method but this verification had four classes rather than three (low, medium, and 
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high), and chemical factories locations were additionally overlaid as another data set for 
verification, since the potential chemical hazard occurrence map included both chemical 
hazards from factories and accidents (Table 2). 
Firstly, the results of verification with the chemical accident record showed a similar result to 
the previous verification of hazard and risk maps. Most chemical accidents appeared in areas 
where both factory hazard and accident hazard were high. For instance, 379 chemical 
accidents out of 418 were observed in HFHA areas between 2013 to 2015. Considering area 
size differences among the four classes, the calculated density percentage of HFHA meant it 
was still the highest density percentage class (77.5%). Busan, Daegu, Daejeon, Ulsan cities’ 
chemical accidents only appeared in HFHA areas, and the Capital region had 157 out of 160 
accidents with a density percentage of 86.3%. The verification results from 2016 to 2017 and 
2013 to 2017 also showed similar results to the previous verification results, and most 
chemical accidents were found in HFHA areas. Secondly, the number of chemical factories in 
each class was examined, and the majority of chemical factories are located in HFHA regions, 
but a high number of chemical factories were found in HFLA areas, reflecting the chemical 
factories without any chemical accidents (Table 2). 
 
<Table 2> 
 
4.  Discussion 
4.1. Spatial Analysis and Chemical Hazard Assessment 
Many chemical factories use more than one chemical material under various concentrations, 
and even synthesize chemicals during the process. The possibility of a chemical accident 
outbreak in a factory can be deduced from the total failure rate of factories’ facilities and 
human factors, but it requires a precise survey on entire work-place [62]. For these reasons, 
applying previous hazard estimation methodology was very resource and time intensive when 
applying national scale investment. Currently the Korean government obtains information of 
each factories’ chemical materials and their facilities under CMMA. The publication of the 
data from CMMA may provide enough information to calculate the hazard level and accident 
probability for each factory, which can increase the accuracy of spatial analyses of hazard 
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estimation. 
This study can be improved by adding temporal factors into the spatial analysis and 
examining the changes of chemical hazard with time. For spatial temporal analysis, a 
complement of chemical accident data is necessary because one chemical accident in a year is 
not enough to proceed with spatial analysis. The integration of chemical accident data from 
reliable sources can improve the study and potentially allow researchers to conduct spatial-
temporal analysis of chemical hazards and potential accident location. Furthermore on data, 
magnitude of the factories and accidents are dubious. For instance, chemical amount, death, 
and financial loss were mostly zero for all the records which was an obstacle for 
environmental risk assessment. Another limitation is that the study did not consider the 
factors or geographical condition of the area. Only the number of chemical factories and 
accidents were used as hazard indicators because information was limited. In future studies, 
other factors, such as obsolete equipment, chemical materials, elevation, and slope of the area, 
could be introduced for improvement of models. 
Though there are many limitations of the study, it has a distinctive feature; the number of 
chemical factories and chemical accidents in the 25-km
2
 grid were used as attribute values for 
spatial analysis to estimate hazard and risk. This methodology can be applied on a national 
scale risk assessment, which is usually challenging with other methods. The result of the 
spatial analysis described the spatial distribution of hazard and risk levels, which could be 
used for the safety management system. 
 
4.2. Classification of Chemical Hazard  
The geometrical interval classified integrated factory hazard and accident hazard into four 
groups (LFLA, LFHA, HFLA, and HFHA) and identified the spatial location and area of 
each group. The four groups represent different hazard levels in areas and illustrates the 
potential chemical hazard occurrence in future, therefore the safety management plan should 
be tailored dependent on their group.  
The absence of chemical factories and accidents suggests that LFLA is the safest group, 
where a site management plan seems unnecessary. LFHA group also had no chemical 
factories, but the risk level was high in the area because of a chemical accident during 
transportation. The accident during transportation was ranked as the third chemical accident 
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cause [35], and it is difficult to predict where chemical accidents are going to occur because 
they are mobile, unlike chemical factories. Singapore, Canada, the United States, European 
Union, and England have established a chemical transportation accident management system 
[63,64]. In Korea, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation had embarked on a 
project on tracking chemical material transportation vehicles in 2015, but only reached the 
testing level [65]. Installation of safety equipment near roads in the LFHA area is a possible 
solution for managing transportation accidents until a proper management system is 
introduced.  
The verification result showed that 84% of new chemical accidents between 2016 and 2017 
occurred in the high risk area, where previous accidents have taken place. This skewed 
accident occurrence with evenly distributed chemical factories in HFLA and HFHA, and was 
irrational so the input data was rescanned and it was identified that the chemical factories in 
HFLA areas are involved with selling and transporting chemical substances, whereas 
factories in HFHA areas are involved with synthesizing chemicals and manufacturing 
chemical goods. Furthermore, HFHA and HFLA areas were clustered on the map because the 
Korean government restricts land use, especially under the Harmful Chemical Substance 
Management Act, under which the construction of chemical factories is strictly restricted by 
their type of business [66]. 
The four groups were ranked by their danger level from a safety management perspective, 
and HFHA was ranked as the most dangerous group due to frequent accident outbreaks 
requiring much management effort, and LFLA was ranked as the safest group because of the 
absence of both chemical factories and accidents. HFLA was considered a safer group 
compared to LFHA because though HFLA areas contain factories where potential accidents 
might occur in the future, the accidents in HFLA areas can be managed under the current 
system. Alternatively, chemical accidents in LFHA areas are hard to predict, yet there is no 
proper management system. 
Limitations of hazard classification remained as high prediction uncertainties of LFHA group, 
accident from transportation; and simplified the hazard groups by four while BASF risk 
Matrix identifies 20 groups [67]. These limitations can be overcome with data 
supplementation, and the study is still meaningful because previous methods, such as the 
BASF risk Matrix, were intended to assess risks in a specific factory, whereas this study 
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assessed hazard levels on a national scale. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this study, chemical hazard in Korea was estimated by spatial analysis of number of 
chemical factories and accidents. The values were extracted from the spatial analysis result 
and their spatial similarity was examined by juxtaposing the two values with respect to their 
location. 
The 4 groups were identified and they represent different chemical safety management issues 
in Korea; a safe LFLA group, many chemical reseller factories were found in HFLA group, 
chemical transportation accidents were in the LFHA group, and an abundance of factories 
and accidents were in the HFHA group. Spatial temporal analysis could have been conducted 
to present hazard and risk changes respective to time, which can identify vulnerable seasons 
or periods of chemical accidents. There is not yet enough data for spatial temporal analysis. A 
limitation of classification was the over simplification of hazard and risk classifications, but a 
national scale safety assessment is still a meaningful result.  
Distinctive features of this study include a methodology that estimates chemical hazards 
through spatial analysis of chemical factories and accident densities, and classified areas with 
different chemical hazard occurrence in future. Founding of this study can be applied to 
safety management by suggesting different management plans for each group and increase 
the efficiency in chemical safety management systems. In future studies, geographic factors 
can be applied to increase the accuracy of the result, and the application of new factors could 
identify the risk from chemical transportation accidents, which the current classification 
method could not estimate. 
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Figure 1. Spatial distribution of chemical factories and accidents in South Korea 
(a. Chemical factory, b. Chemical accident, c. both) 
  
(a) (b) (c) 
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Figure 2. Result of Spatial autocorrelation 
(a) Chemical factory 
(b) Chemical accident 
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Figure 3. Geometrical series variables  
(a) Number of factories in a grid (b) Number of accidents in a grid 
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Figure 4. Hazard map from (a) chemical factories and (b) chemical accidents  
(a) (b) 
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Figure 5. Spatial similarity of estimated hazard of chemical accidents and factories  
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Figure 6. Geometric interval applied on estimated hazard of factories and accidents 
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Figure 7. Chemical Accident Hazard Assessment Map 
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Table 1. Verification of hazard estimation 
Type Year 
Hazard 
Level 
Capital 
region 
Busan 
city 
Daegu 
city 
Daejeon 
city 
Ulsan 
city 
Yeosu 
city 
South 
Korea 
Number of 
accidents in 
estimated 
hazard map 
from 
chemical 
factories 
2013 
~2015 
High 
84 
(86.0%) 
14 
(94.1%) 
5 
(76.0%) 
11 
(85.1%) 
26 
(97.7%) 
15 
(90%) 
164 
(83.7%) 
Medium 
63 
(13.8%) 
6 
(5.9%) 
5 
(24.0%) 
1 
(14.9%) 
5 
(2.2%) 
2 
(4.1%) 
183 
(15.4%) 
Low 
10 
(0.2%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(0.1%) 
3 
(5.9%) 
73 
(0.9%) 
2016 
~2017 
High 
13 
(89.5%) 
4 
(96.5%) 
2 
(76.5%) 
4 
(100%) 
5 
(100%) 
3 
(74.7%) 
34 
(87.8%) 
Medium 
7 
(10.3%) 
1 
(3.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(25.3%) 
26 
(11.0%) 
Low 
2 
(0.3%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(23.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
18 
(1.1%) 
2003 
~2017 
High 
97 
(86.5%) 
18 
(94.6%) 
7 
(76.1%) 
15 
(91.1%) 
31 
(98.1%) 
18 
(87.0%) 
198 
(84.4%) 
Medium 
70 
(13.3%) 
7 
(5.4%) 
5 
(17.2%) 
1 
(8.9%) 
5 
(1.9%) 
5 
(1.9%) 
209 
(14.6%) 
Low 
12 
(0.2%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(6.7%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(0.1%) 
3 
(0.1%) 
91 
(0.9%) 
Number of 
accidents in 
estimated 
hazard map 
from 
chemical 
accidents 
2016 
~2017 
High 
13 
(89.5%) 
3 
(89.0%) 
2 
(76.5%) 
3 
(96.0%) 
5 
(100%) 
3 
(89.8%) 
28 
(84.5%) 
Medium 
7 
(10.3%) 
1 
(4.4%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(4.0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(10.2%) 
28 
(13.9%) 
Low 
2 
(0.3%) 
1 
(6.6%) 
1 
(23.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
22 
(1.6%) 
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Table 2. Verification of the four-classification result by HFHA (High Factory and High Accident), LFHA (Low 
Factory and High Accident), HFLA (High Factory and Low Accident), LFLA (Low Factory and Low Accident). 
Number of accidents in four classes 
2013 
~2015 
 
Capital 
region 
Busan 
city 
Daegu 
city 
Daejeon 
city 
Ulsan 
city 
Yeosu 
city 
South 
Korea 
HF, HA 
157 
(86.3%) 
18 
(100%) 
10 
(100%) 
12 
(100%) 
31 
(100%) 
19 
(66.0%) 
379 
(77.5%) 
LF, HA 
3 
(13.7%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(34.0%) 
39 
(22.5%) 
HF, LA 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
LF, LA 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2016 
~2017 
HF, HA 
19 
(63.3%) 
4 
(74.5%) 
2 
(45.1%) 
4 
(100%) 
5 
(100%) 
4 
(100%) 
58 
(75.9%) 
LF, HA 
1 
(27.8%) 
1 
(25.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(7.3%) 
HF, LA 
1 
(5.7%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
9 
(14.5%) 
LF, LA 
1 
(3.3%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(54.9%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
9 
(2.3%) 
2013 
~2017 
HF, HA 
176 
(83.0%) 
22 
(94.1%) 
12 
(83.2%) 
16 
(100%) 
36 
(100%) 
23 
(70.2%) 
437 
(77.3%) 
LF, HA 
4 
(15.7%) 
1 
(5.9%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(29.8%) 
41 
(20.5%) 
HF, LA 
1 
(0.8%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
9 
(2.0%) 
LF, LA 
1 
(0.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(16.8%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
9 
(0.3%) 
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Number of factories in four classes 
2016 
~2017 
 
Capital 
region 
Busan 
city 
Daegu 
city 
Daejeon 
city 
Ulsan 
city 
Yeosu 
city 
South 
Korea 
HF, HA 
2589 
(83.1%) 
381 
(79.8%) 
349 
(90.8%) 
87 
(83.3%) 
333 
(83.9%) 
106 
(81.9%) 
4916 
(82.2%) 
LF, HA 
2 
(0.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(3.8%) 
6 
(0.3%) 
HF, LA 
299 
(16.4%) 
60 
(20.2%) 
11 
(9.2%) 
4 
(16.7%) 
16 
(16.1%) 
2 
(14.3%) 
856 
(17.6%) 
LF, LA 
2 
(0.1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
23 
(0.1%) 
 
 
 
